We focus on the optimal value for various information-theoretical tasks. There are several studies for the asymptotic expansion for these optimal values up to the order √ n or log n. However, these expansions have errors of the order o( √ n) or o(log n), which does not goes to zero asymptotically. To resolve this problem, we derive the asymptotic expansion up to the constant order for upper and lower bounds of these optimal values. While the expansions of upper and lower bonds do not match, they clarify the ranges of these optimal values, whose errors go to zero asymptotically.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, second order analysis and finite-length analysis attract much attention [1] , [2] , [3] , [4] , [5] , [6] . However, there is a gap between these two analyses as follows. To see this difference, we focus on secure random number generation when a partial information is leaked to the third party [7] , [8] . It is very useful to calculate the maximum size N ε n of secure keys under the constraint that the secrecy measure is less than ε when n outcomes are generated according to the independent and identical distribution of a certain distribution. However, its calculation amount is extremely large so that we cannot calculate it in a realistic time with a practical length n. Instead of this evaluation, in second order analysis, we derive asymptotic expansion of log N ε n up to the order √ n as A 1 n + A 2,ε √ n + o( √ n)(or O(log n)) [2] , [3] , [5] , [6] , [9] . Hence, A 1 n + A 2,ε √ n can be regarded as an approximation of log N ε n . However, since the error behaves as o( √ n)(or O(log n)), it is difficult to evaluate the error of this approximation. Hence, even when we draw the graph of this approximation, it is not easy to identify the true value of log N ε n in the graph. In the third order analysis, we derive its asymptotic expansion up to the order log n like A 1 n + A 2,ε √ n + A 3 log n + O(1) [10] , [11] , [12] , [13] . However, it is still difficult to evaluate the error of the approximation because it behaves as an unknown constant. Instead of this evaluation, in finite-length analysis, we derive upper and lower bounds of log N ε n while tighter bounds are preferable. To derive the second or third order asymptotics, we often derive upper and lower bounds, and make their asymptotic expansion because it is quite difficult to directly derive the asymptotic expansion of log N ε n . Indeed, if upper and lower bounds match their asymptotic expansion up to the order √ n or log n, one might consider that the upper and lower bounds are useful. However, we cannot say that these bounds are useful if their calculation amount is very large. As is pointed in [14, Table 1 ][15, Table 1 ], for their calculation, this kinds of upper and lower bonds require the calculation of the cumulant distribution function of the the independent and identical distribution of a certain distribution related to our task. If the distribution is binary distribution, we can easily calculate the cumulant distribution function. Unfortunately, in the general case, its calculation is very large. In this paper, to resolve this problem, we propose the concept of semi-finite length analysis as follows. First, we derive upper and lower bounds of log N ε n . Then, we make their asymptotic expansion up to the constant term like A 1 n + A 2,ε √ n + A 3 log n + A 4 + O(1/ √ n). In this case, the difference between the approximation A 1 n+ A 2,ε √ n+ A 3 log n+ A 4 and the true bound is guaranteed to converge to zero. Hence, we can say that the absolute of the difference is smaller than 1 when n is sufficiently large. Thus, from these approximations of upper and lower bounds, we can estimate the range of the true value of log N ε n . Since the aim is the approximate calculation of the upper and lower bounds, their asymptotic expansions do not necessarily need to match each other. But, if their first order coefficients do not match each other, the upper and/or lower bounds are so loose that they are not useful. We call this type of analysis the semi-finite length analysis for upper or lower bounds, which can be summarized as follows. R1 We can calculate the asymptotic expansion up to the constant term of the upper bound like A . This kind of problem has not been discussed except for the source coding without side information [1] , [16] .
In this paper, we address this problem for secure random number generation. To tackle this problem, using several useful existing results, we derive upper and lower bounds for log N ε n of secure keys under the constraint that the secrecy measure is less than ε when n outcomes are generated according to the independent and identical distribution of a certain distribution. For their asymptotic expansion, we employ Edgeworth expansion and strong large deviation, which were derived by Bahadur and Rao [17] . Indeed, strong large deviation was employed for information theory in the papers [13] , [18] , [19] . While the papers [13] , [18] , [19] employed saddle point approximation in addition to strong large deviation, in a similar way to the papers [20] , [21] , [22] , [23] in other topics, we directly use the formula for strong large deviation to calculate higher order asymptotics so that we do not employ saddle point approximation.
The next target is channel coding, which has two famous finite-length bounds, the dependent test (DT) bound [24, Remark 15] [6] and the meta converse bound [25] [26, Section 4.6] [6] . To discuss channel coding, using a similar derivation based on strong large deviation and Edgeworth expansion, we derive semi-finite length expansion in the simple binary hypothesis testing with two frameworks, which are related to the above two types of bounds. In fact, these two types of bounds can be used for source coding with side information [27, Theorem 7] . Then, applying these expansions, we derive upper and lower bounds for this setting in the sense of semi-finite length analysis. In the same way, we derive the same types of upper and lower bounds for channel coding when we assume a symmetric condition for channel, the conditional additive condition defined in [14, Section IV] because this assumption brings simple derivation, which enables us to get an asymptotic expansion up to the constant order. Finally, we proceed to wire-tap channel [28] , [29] , [30] , [31] . In this model, as pointed in [32, Section V][33, Section VIII][34, Conclusions], we combine the results of secure random number generation and channel coding. Then, when the wire-tap channel is degraded and the channels to the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper are conditional additive, we derive the desired asymptotic expansion while the paper [35] discusses the second order asymptotics for generic wire-tap channels.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we summarize notations used in this paper. Section III discusses secure random number generation. Next, Section IV treats simple binary hypothesis testing. Section V treats fixed-length source coding. by sing the result of Section IV. Then, using the result of Section IV, Section VI proceeds to channel coding. Applying the results of Sections III and VI, Section VII addresses wire-tap channel coding. To show the asymptotic expansion given in Sections III and IV, Section VIII prepares knowledge of strong large deviation and Edgeworth expansion. Using these tools, Sections IX and X show the asymptotic expansion stated in Sections III and IV, respectively. Section XI gives the conclusion.
II. PRELIMINARIES
To discuss higher order asymptotics, we need several information quantities. In this section, we prepare notations used in this paper and prepare these information quantities.
A. Notations
For a set A, let P(A) be the set of all probability distribution on A. It is also convenient to introduce the setP(A) of all sub-normalized non-negative functions. We denote the set of conditional distributions on B conditioned with A by P(B|A). Given a distribution P A ∈ P(A), a conditional distribution P B|A ∈ P(B|A), we define the joint distribution P B|A × P A ∈ P(A × B) as P B|A × P A (b, a) := P B|A (b|a)P A (a). In particular, P B|A=a is defined as P B|A=a (b) := P B|A (b, a). When the conditional distribution P B|A=a does not depend on a ∈ A, this notation expresses the product distribution. That is, P E × P A is defined as P B × P A (b, a) := P B (b)P A (a). We define the distribution P B|A · P A ∈ P(B) as P B|A × P A (b, a) := a∈A P B|A (b|a)P A (a). Given P AB ∈ P(A × B), the marginal distribution P A is defined as P A (a) := b∈B P AB (a, b). Also, the normalized uniform distribution on A is denoted by U A . We define the distribution P n A on A n as P n A (a 1 , . . . , a n ) := P A (a 1 ) · · · P A (a n ). We define the conditional distribution P n B|A on B n conditioned with A as P n B|A (b 1 , . . . , b n |a 1 , . . . , a n ) := P B|A (b 1 |a 1 ) · · · P B|A (b n |a n ). Further, E P and V P express the expectation and the variance under the distribution P ∈P(A), respectively, as follows.
B. Information quantity for first order asymptotics Given two distributions P, Q ∈P(A), the difference between two distributions are evaluated by the variational distance defined by
Also, we use the relative entropy D(P Q) and the entropy H(P )
where throughout this paper, the base of the logarithm is chosen to be e. We introduce special notations for distributions P and Q on the joint system A and B. We assume that their marginal distributions on B are the same distribution P B and their conditional distributions on A condition with B are given as P A|B and Q A|B . Then, we use the notation D(P A|B Q A|B |P B ) :
. When a distribution Q on A × B is given as P AB and a distribution Q on A × B is given as Q(a, b) = R B (b) by using a distribution R B on A, we write D(P Q) as D(P AB R B ). For P AB ∈P(A × B) and a normalized R B ∈ P(B), the conditional entropy H(P AB |R B ) relative to R B is defined to be −D(P AB R B ). When P AB is a normalized distribution and R B is the marginal distribution P B , H(P AB |P B ) is a non-negative value. Then, we define the conditional minimum entropy relative to R B [37] H min (P AB |R B ) := − log max
The conditional Rényi entropy of order 2 relative to R B is defined as
C. Information quantity for higher order asymptotics
In this paper, to get higher order expansions, given two distributions P, Q ∈P(A), we employ the relative entropy variance V (P Q) and κ(P Q) as
which equals the skewness, i.e., the normalized third cumulant of − log P Q
. To define more complicated values, we employ the lattice span d (P Q) of the variable − log P Q , which is defined in the beginning of Section VIII. For example, when − log P Q is a continuous variable, the lattice span d (P Q) is zero. Then, we define the function v(d) as
To describe the constant term of the asymptotic expansion, using v(d (P Q) ) and Φ(x) :=
)dx, we define
Strassen [1] implicitly used the quantity F ε 4 (P Q) for the non-lattice case, i.e., for the case of d = 0 in the context of source coding with no side information and hypothesis testing. Kontoyiannis and Verdú [16] explicitly discussed it for the non-lattice case in the context of source coding with no side information as [16, (36) ]. Also, Moulin [13] defined the quantity V (P Q) [13, (2.12) and (2.14)] for the general case in the context of channel coding. Remember that we defined D(P A|B Q A|B |P B ) and D(P AB R B ) in the previous subsection. This kind of definition is also applied to the quantities defined in this subsection. That is, V (P AB R B ) and F ε i (P AB R B ) are defined in the same way as in the previous subsection.
Although the definitions in Section II assume that the sets A and B are discrete, these definitions are applied to the general measurable case when the sets A and B are measurable sets. In this case, P(A) is the set of probability measures on A,P(A) is the set of non-negative measures on A, and P(B|A) is the set of conditional probability measures µ B|A=a on B conditioned with a ∈ A. In this case, the functions P Q and Q P are defined as the Radon-Nikodym derivatives between two measures Q and P . The definition (4) is generalized as
holds almost everywhere with respect to P AB . . (14) However, the uniform distribution U A is defined only when A is discrete and finite.
III. SECURE RANDOM NUMBER GENERATION A. Problem Formulation
Let P AE ∈P(A × E) be a sub-normalized non-negative function. For a function f : A → S and the key S = f (A), let
We define the security by
Although the quantity d(f |P AE ) has no operational meaning for unnormalized P AE , it will be used to derive bounds on d(f |P AE ) for normalized P AE . For distribution P AE ∈ P(A × E) and security parameter ε ≥ 0, we are interested in characterizing
The inverse function is given as
B. Single shot Analysis First, we employ the smooth minimum entropy framework that was mainly introduced and developed by Renner and his collaborators [36] , [37] , [39] , [40] , [38] . Then, we define
Then, we have a key lemma to derive a upper bound of ℓ ε (P AE ). Proposition 1 (Monotonicity [34, Lemma 2] ): For any function f : X → S, P AE ∈ P(A × E), and R E ∈ P(E), we have
For readers' convenience, we give a proof in Appendix A.
Using Proposition 1, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2 ( [34, Theorem 1]):
For P AE ∈ P(A × E), we have
The inequality is equivalent to
Since the paper [34] skips the detail proof of Proposition 2, we give its proof for reader's convenience.
Proof of Proposition 2:
Let f : A → S be a function to achieve the bound ℓ ε (P AE ). Then, the resultant distribution
. Thus, Proposition 1 yields (17). To derive the opposite evaluation, we introduce
To improve the evaluation, using the conditional Rényi entropy of order 2, we define
Then, we obtain the following opposite evaluation.
Proposition 3 ([34, Corollary 2][41, Lemma 23][9, Proposition 23]):
For P AE ∈ P(A × E) and R E ∈ P(E), we have
For readers' convenience, we give a proof in Appendix B. Combining Propositions 2, 3, we have the following evaluation.
for any distribution R E ∈ P(E).
C. Semi-finite block-length Analysis
To calculate the above upper and lower bounds, it is important to evaluate the values
> m and P AE − log
≤ m for a given value m. In the asymptotic situation, strong large deviation is known as a method to precisely evaluate the first quantity and Edgeworth expansion is a method to evaluate the difference between the Gaussian distribution and the second value. Combining these two methods, we obtain semi-finite block-length analysis for the lower and upper bounds of ℓ ε (P n AE ) as follows.
Theorem 1: For P AE ∈ P(A × E), we have
Theorem 1 is shown in Section IX.
D. Numerical comparison
We numerically compare our result with the previous results [34] . The paper [34, Theorem 2] derived lower and upper bounds of ℓ ε (P AE ) as
where
Modifying leftover hash lemma (Proposition 3) [47] , [48] , the paper [34, Theorem 6] yields the following lower bound. (27) , Green dashed curve expresses the lower bound given in (29) , Blue dashed curve expresses the lower bound given in (27) , and Black dashed curve expresses the lower bound given in (30). Also, using an exponential upper bound of leaked information ∆(m|P AE ) given in [32] , the paper [34, Theorem 5] derived the following lower bound.
Now, we consider the case such that E is obtained from A throughout BSC, i.e., A = E = F 2 and
In the following, all the information quantities equal those with E is a single element and P AE is given as P A (0) = q and P A (1) = 1 − q. For this comparison, similar to [34] , we set R E to P E and η, ζ to ǫ/2 in (27), (29) , and (30). When we choose q = 0.11 and ǫ = 10 −3 , upper and lower bounds for the secure key generation rates are calculated by changing n in Fig. 4 . When we choose q = 0.11 and n = 3000 and 100000, upper and lower bounds for the secure key generation rates are calculated by changing ǫ in Figs. 2 and 3, respectively. These figures show that our bounds improve the bounds in the previous paper [34] . 
E. Sacrifice bit-length
Next, we consider sacrifice bit-length when P A is the uniform distribution. We define the sacrifice bit-length S ε (A|E|P AE ) and its upper bounds as
That is, we have
Since any measure
Hence,
Therefore, we have the following lemma.
Proof: The first inequality follows from the first inequality in (23) . The second inequality can be shown as follows.
where the first and second relations follow from (39) and the second inequality in (23), respectively.
IV. HYPOTHESIS TESTING Now, on a given system A, we study the simple hypothesis testing problem for the null hypothesis P ∈ P(A) versus the alternative hypothesis Q ∈ P(A). However, in the following, we consider a more generalized setting for the application in the later sections. That is, we assume that P ∈ P(A) and Q ∈P(A). In this setting, a test is given as a randomized function T taking values in [0, 1]. When we observe A, we support Q with probability T (A) and does P with probability 1 − T (A). The error probabilities of the first and the second are, respectively, defined by
We focus on the minimum of the error probability of the second kind under the constant constraint of the error probability of the first kind;
The hypothesis testing entropy is defined as
We obtain its semi-finite block-length analysis as follows. Theorem 2: When P ∈ P(A) and Q ∈P(A), we have
This theorem is shown in Subsection X-A.
His expansion is the same as ours in the non-lattice case. However, his extra term caused by the lattice span
For a preparation of the analysis of channel coding, we introduce the following quantity.
We obtain its semi-finite block-length analysis as follows. Theorem 3: When P ∈ P(A) and Q ∈P(A), we have
This theorem is shown in Subsection X-B. Remark 2: The paper [19] made a similar analysis. However, while they employ saddlepoint approximation in addition to strong large deviation, our derivation is based on a simple combination of strong large deviation and Edgeworth expansion.
V. FIXED-LENGTH SOURCE CODING
We consider fixed-length source coding. First, we discuss the case without side information when the information is generated subject to the distribution P X . When we impose the decoding error probability to be not greater than ε, we denote the minimum size of memory by N ε (X|P X ). Counting the number of input elements to be correctly decoded, we have
where I is the counting measure. Hence, in the i.i.d. setting, using the asymptotic expansion given in
Remark 3: Here, we should remark the relation between fixed-length source coding and lossless variablelength source coding In lossless variable-length source coding, we focus on the overflow probability for the respective coding length. As pointed in [16, Section I-D], the minium overflow probability for the respective coding length equals N ε (X|P X ). While the papers [2] , [16] gave an asymptotic evaluation for the minium overflow probability for the respective coding length, they can be regarded as the result for N ε (X|P X ).
In addition, the paper [16, Theorems 17 and 18] derived similar evaluation as (51). Their evaluation is different from (51) in the following point. The equation (51) is the asymptotic expansion, in which we did not exactly give an upper bound of the error term. It shows that the error term has the behavior with order O(
). In contrast, Theorems 17 and 18 in [16] gave upper and lower bounds without error. Hence, their terms of the constant order are different from (51).
Next, we discuss the compression of the variable X with side information Y when the information is generated subject to the distribution P X,Y . When we impose the decoding error probability to be not greater than ε, we denote the minimum size of memory by N ε (X|Y |P X,Y ). Proposition 4 ([27, Theorem 7] ): For a probability distribution P X,Y ∈ P(X × Y), we have
The first inequality of (52) is the same as the first inequality of [27, Theorem 7] . The second inequality of (52) was essentially derived in the proof of the second inequality of [27, Theorem 7] . For the readers' convenience, we show the second inequality of (52) in Appendix C.
Applying Theorems 2 and 3 to −D
, respectively, we obtain the following theorems.
Theorem 4: For a probability distribution P X,Y ∈ P(X × Y), we have
Now, we consider a channel from the input discrete system X to the output system Y. The channel is written as conditional distribution W . When the input distribution is P X , we denote the joint distribution over X × Y by W × P X , and the output distribution over Y by W · P X . Then, the mutual information is written as I(X; Y ) P X := D(W × P X (W · P X ) × P X ). The channel capacity is given by C W := max P X I(X; Y ) P X . Then, we define
, we define V ε to be V − . Otherwise, we define V ε to be V + . We denote the distribution in C to attain V ε by P ε .
Under the channel W , we denote the maximum size of transmitted information with decoding error probability ε > 0 by N ε (W ). Hence, when we use the channel W n times, this maximum number is written as N ε (W n ).
Proposition 5 ([24, Remark 15][6]):
For a channel W ∈ P(Y|X ) and a distribution P X ∈ P(X ), we have 
Substituting P n ε and W n into P X and W in Proposition 5 and Theorem 3, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 5: For a channel W ∈ P(Y|X ), we have
In fact, the random coding union (RCU) bound achieves the lower bound 
B. Conditional additive channel 1) Direct part:
On the other hand, a channel W is called conditional additive when Y is written as X ×Ỹ, X is an additive group, and the W (x,ỹ|x ′ ) = W (x − x ′ ,ỹ|0) relation holds. We denote the set of conditional additive channels from X to Y by P a (Y|X ). For example, as shown in [14, Section IV-C], additive Gaussian channel with the BPSK scheme can be regarded as a conditional additive channel. In the following discussion, we use the notation P X,Ỹ (x,ỹ) := W (x,ỹ|0). In this case, an encoder is called algebraic when the message set is an additive group and the encoder is a homomorphism. In n uses of the channel W , under the above restriction, we denote the maximum size of transmitted information with decoding error probability ε > 0 by N ε a (W ). Then, we have the relation N ε (W ) ≥ N ε a (W ) and the following proposition.
Proposition 7 ([42] , [14, Lemma 20] ): For a conditional additive channel W ∈ P a (Y|X ), the uniform distribution U X on X satisfies
Now, we define P Y (y) :
. Then, we apply the above discussion to the channel
Using Proposition 7, the first equation in (59), and Theorem 3, we have the following theorem. Theorem 6: For a conditional additive channel W ∈ P a (Y|X ), we have
To get another expression of (60) based on the structure Y = X ×Ỹ, Z = X ×Z. we see
. . , 5. Using Proposition 7, the second equation in (59), Theorem 3, and these relations, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 7: For a conditional additive channel W ∈ P a (Y|X ), we have
2) Converse part: Similarly, for any x n ∈ X n , we have
Using Proposition 6, (62), and Theorem 2, we have the following theorem. Theorem 8: For a conditional additive channel W ∈ P a (Y|X ), we have
The paper [10, Theorem 55] derived the same evaluation up to the order log n under the weakly input-symmetric condition [10, Definition 9], which is similar to the conditional additive condition, but is different from it. The same relation was shown for general DMS channels in [11, Theorem 1] and for AWGN channel with energy constraint in [6, Theorem 65] . Their achievability was shown in [10, Corollary 54] and [12, (9) ], respectively. However, they did not derive the constant term of the upper bound.
The combination of the results [10] and [11] gives the tight evaluation up to the order log n. However, their method does not give the evaluation of the error of the order O(1). Since the error of the order O(1) cannot be estimated, their method cannot give the possible range of the maximum transmittable length log N ε a (W n ) precisely. On the other hand, the combination of Theorems 6 (7) and 8 gives upper and lower bounds for the maximum transmittable length log N ε a (W n ) with small error o(1/ √ n). Since the error of the order o(1/ √ n) is guaranteed to converge to zero, our method gives the possible range of the true value of log N ε a (W n ) when n is sufficiently large.
VII. WIRE-TAP CHANNEL CODING A. Direct part
Next, we consider wire-tap channel coding, in which, there are three players, the sender, and the legitimate receiver, and the eavesdropper. The input system of the sender is written by X , and the systems of the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper are written by Y and Z, respectively. The channels to the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper are are written as conditional distributions W Y and W Z on Y and Z with conditioned to X , respectively. Hence, a pair of channels (W Y , W Z ) gives a wire-tap channel. In n uses of these channels, the quality of this task for a wire-tap code φ is characterized by the decoding error probability ε(φ) and the following secrecy measure
where P M,Z is the joint distribution of the message M and the eavesdropper's information Z, and P M ×P Z is the product distribution of the marginal distributions P M and P Z . First, we discuss the performance when a wire-tap code is constructed from a specific algebraic error correcting code. We assume that X is an additive group whose order is a prime power and a wire-tap channel W Y , W Z is conditional additive. Then, Y and Z are written as X ×Ỹ and X ×Z, respectively. In the following, we employ two distribution P X,Ỹ and P X,Z defined as P X,Ỹ (x,ỹ) := W Y (x,ỹ|0) and P X,Z (x,z) := W Z (x,z|0). Then, we impose the algebraic condition to our code. In n uses of these channels, under this restriction for codes, we choose an algebraic error correcting code with an encoder φ e and a decoder φ d , and denote its coding size N c (φ e , φ d ). Then, we denote the message of this code bỹ M and the set of messages byM. When the sender sends the messageM , we denote the joint distribution ofM and the eavesdropper's information Z n by PM ,Z n . Since the size of the set X is a prime power, that of M is also a prime power. Hence, we can choose sets M and L such that log |L| = ℓ δ (PM ,Z n ) and |M| · |L| =M. First, we choose a hash function f fromM → M such that d(f |PM ,Z n ) ≤ δ. We choose a function g f from M · L toM such that f (g f (m, l)) = m. Then, we define the encoder and the decoder for wire-tap channel as follows. When the sender intended to transmit the message m, she generates the random variable L subject to the uniform distribution on L, and transmit φ e (g f (m, L) ). The legitimate receiver apply the function f • φ d to the received information Y n . We denote this code by φ(f, φ e , φ d ) As explained in [43, Appendix A], this kind of code construction is practical because we can choose an error correcting code with small decoding complexity and the implementation of g f is also easy. Then, we have
Denoting the size of the message of the wire-tap code φ by N w (φ), we have
Now, we consider the situation when the sender generates X n subject to U n X . Then, we identifyM with an additive subgroup of X n . We can define the quotient set X n /M. For any element X n ∈ X n , we denote the coset in X n /M which contains X n by [X n ]. When the sender inform the coset inform the information [X n ] to the eavesdropper, due to the algebraic structure, the information leakage does not depends on the value [X n ]. Hence, we have
where the inequality follows from Lemma 1. We denote Z by X ′ ×Z, where we use the notation X ′ to distinguish the set from the input system X while it is the same set as X . Thus, we have
where the inequality (a) follows from (66) and (67), and the equation (b) follows from the combination of (23) and (26) in Theorem 1 with substituting U X ′ × PZ = W Z · U X into R Z . In the derivation, we also use the relations
We rewrite the above evaluation by using the structure Y = X ×Ỹ, Z = X ×Z.
where the second equation follows from the relation
where the inequality (a) follows from (66), (67), and (69), and the equation (b) can be shown in the same way as (68). Now, we proceed the analysis on the optimal performance. For this aim, we denote the maximum size of transmitted information under the conditions ε(φ) ≤ ε and δ(φ) ≤ δ by N ε,δ (W Y , W Z ). The aim of the following discussion is to evaluate N ε,δ (W n Y , W n Z ). We prepare an algebraic code for channel coding with n use of the channel W Y with the decoding error probability ε and the size of message N ε a (W n Y , U n X ). We apply this algebraic code to the above wire-tap code construction, which satisfies the condition (65). Using (68) and Theorem 6, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 9: When X is an additive group whose order is a prime power and a wire-tap channel W Y , W Z is conditional additive,
Using (68) and Theorem 7, we have the following theorem. Theorem 10: Under the same assumption as Theorem 9, we have
The paper [35, Theorem 13] derived a similar evaluation as (71) and (72) up to the order of √ n in generic channels. While the discussed more generic channels, they did not derived the constant term. 
B. Converse part
Remark 4: Originally, the paper [44] showed the above statement as their Theorem 6 when feedback is allowed. Since the distribution P X corresponds to our code, the case with the distribution P X with no feedback corresponds to the case when no feedback is allowed. Hence, Theorem 6 of [44] yields the above statement.
We
Thus, we have the following theorem. Theorem 11: When a wire-tap channel W Y , W Z is conditional additive and degraded, we have
Proof: The inequality (a) of (75) follows from Proposition 8. The second part (b) of (75) follows from (74) and Theorem 2.
The paper [35, Theorem 13 ] derived a similar evaluation as (75) up to the order of √ n in generic channels. While the discussed more generic channels, they did not derived the constant term.
C. Binary symmetric channels
As an example of additive wire-tap channel, we consider the pair of binary symmetric channels, in which, W Y and W Z are the binary symmetric channels with crossover probability p Y and p Z with 
where h(p) is the binary entropy, v(p) is the varentropy, and f ε i (p) is F ε i (P Q) when P is the binary distribution with flip probability p and Q is the identify function 1.
Next, we proceed to the converse part. The channelW Z|Y is the binary symmetric channel with the crossover probability
, which is the solution of p + p Y − 2pp Y = p Z with respect to p. The channelW Y |Z is also the binary symmetric channel with the crossover probability
Then, (75) is simplified to Fig. 4 numerically compares the upper and lower bounds in (76) and (81). Also, it compares with the second order approximations given in [35] . It shows that our higher correction is not so negligible. 
D. BPSK scheme
As an example of conditional additive wire-tap channel, we consider a pair of BPSK Gaussian channels. As shown in [14, Section IV-C], a BPSK Gaussian channel is conditional additive. Our Gaussian wire-tap channel is given as
where N Y and N Z are subject to the Gaussian distribution with average 0 and variance σ 2 Y and σ 2 Z , respectively. We assume the relation σ 2 Y < σ 2 Z . The input signal X is limited to 1 or −1. Let ϕ a,σ 2 be the probability density function of the Gaussian distribution with average a and variance σ 2 . We define the distributionφ σ byφ σ 2 (x) := 1 2
Next, we consider the converse part. The channelW Z|Y is given as
where N Z|Y is subject to the Gaussian distribution with average 0 and variance σ 
The paper [35, Theorem 14] discussed the Gaussian channel with energy constraint. This paper focuses on BPSK scheme, which is different from the result of [35, Theorem 14] .
E. Secure communication based on correlated random variable
As an example of conditional additive wire-tap channel, we consider secure communication by the correlated variablesX,Ỹ , andZ, which are subject to the joint distribution PX ,Ỹ ,Z , and take values inX ,Ỹ, Z, respectively [32, Section VI] . Assume that the sender, the legitimate receiver, and the eavesdropper have the variablesX,Ỹ , andZ, respectively. We assume thatX equals an additive group X .
Then, we consider the wire-tap channel with the input system X in the following way. When the input is X ∈ X , the sender sends X +X to the legitimate receiver via a public channel. Hence, due to the property of the public channel, the information X +X is also leaked to the eavesdropper. That is, the legitimate receiver receives the variable Y = (Ỹ , X +X) ∈ Y := X ×Ỹ, and the eavesdropper receives the variable Z = (Z, X +X) ∈ Z := X ×Z. The conditional distribution to characterize our wire-tap channel is given as W Y (x,ỹ|x) = PX ,Ỹ (x − x,ỹ) and W Z (x,z|x) = PX ,Z (x − x,z). Hence, the wire-tap channel W Y , W Z is conditional additive. In this model, we have P X,Ỹ = PX ,Ỹ and P X,Z = PX ,Z . Hence, we obtain a lower bound of log N ε,δ,n,a (W Y , W Z ) of this model by replacing P X,Ỹ and P X,Z by PX ,Ỹ and PX ,Z in the RHS of (72).
Next, we consider the converse part. For this aim, we assume the Markovian chainX −Ỹ −Z.
Hence, the upper bound of log
given in the RHS of (75) can be calculated to
VIII. STRONG LARGE DEVIATION AND EDGEWORTH EXPANSION Let p be a non-negative measure and d S be the lattice span of the real valued function X, which is defined as follows. Let S be the set of the support of the measure p • X −1 . When there exists a nonnegative value x satisfying {a − b} a,b∈S ⊂ xZ, the real valued function X is called a lattice function or a lattice variable. Then, the lattice span d S is defined as the maximum value of the above non-negative value x. Denoting all of elements of S as a 1 < a 2 < . . . < a l , we have
due to the following reason; When integers y 1 , . . . , y l have the greatest common divisor 1, there exist integers n 1 , . . . , n l such that l i=1 n i y i = 1. When there does not exist such a non-negative value x, the real valued function X is called a non-lattice function or a non-lattice variable. Then, the lattice span d S is regarded as zero. Now, we summarize the fundamental properties for the lattice and non-lattice cases. For this purpose, we denote the set { n i=1 a i } a i ∈S by S n . Lemma 2: We fix a small real number δ > 0. In the lattice case, there exists a sufficiently large integer N such that S n satisfies the following condition for any n ≥ N. Denote all of elements of
In the non-lattice case, for an arbitrary small real number ε, there exists a sufficiently large integer N such that S n satisfies the following condition for any n ≥ N. Denote all of elements of
Proof:
We define the subsets S + := {a i ∈ S|n i ≥ 0} and S − := {a i ∈ S|n i < 0}, the positive integers 
with integers c 1 and c 2 ≤ m 1 . When (c 1 m 1 + c 2 ) takes the maximum, x is n(a l − δ + ), i.e., c 1 m 1 + c 2 = (n − m 1 m 2 )m 1 . So, the maximum of c 1 is n − m 1 m 2 .
Using (90) and the definitions of δ − an A, we have
Here, the relation (a) follows from the following facts; c 1 and (n − c 1 − m 1 m 2 ) are non-negative integers, c 2 n i is a non-negative integer for i ∈ S + , and −(m 1 − c 2 )n i is a non-negative integer for i ∈ S − . Thus, when we denote all of elements of
When n is sufficiently large, we have δ − , δ + ≤ δ. So, we obtain the desired statement. Non-lattice case: For an arbitrary ε > 0, we can take integers n i such that 0 <d := l i=1 n i a i < ε and n i = 0 is strictly larger than 0, which contradicts d S = 0.) We redefine m 1 := ⌈(a l −a 1 )/ε⌉, and define other terms in the same way by replacing d S byd. Using the same discussion, we find that the element x := n(a 1 +δ − )+c 1 (a l −a 1 )+c 2d ∈
Here p is not necessarily normalized. Define the notation
Denote the inverse function of the derivative τ ′ (s) by η. Proposition 9 (Bahadur and Rao [17] , [45, Theorem 3.7.4] 
and
and χ 
Using this function, we have the following lemma.
Proof: Let s be the real number to satisfy τ
In the non-lattice case, we have
), the combination of Proposition 9, (99), and (101) implies (98).
In the lattice case, we replace − log η(R) by log
). Hence, we obtain (98). When R is close to τ ′ (0), we have the Gaussian approximation. In this case, we have Edgeworth expansion instead of the strong large deviation.
Proposition 10 ([46] ): Assume that p is a probability distribution. Define the skewness, i.e., the normalized version of the third cumlant
Then, we have
where ϕ is the probability density function of the standard Gaussian distribution.
IX. PROOF OF THEOREM 1 In this section, we abbreviate d (P AE P E ) to d. To prove the relation (24), we prepare the following Lemma.
Lemma 4: For P AE ∈ P(A × E), we have
Proof: First, we use another expression of δ min (m|P AE |P E ) as
Th optimal Q AE,opt ∈ P(A × E) is given as follows.
Q AE,opt (a, e) := e −m P E (e) when − log
≤ m P AE (a, e) when − log
Since 2d(Q AE,opt , P AE ) equals to the RHS of (104), we obtain Eq. (104). The relation (24) follows from the following Lemma 5.
Lemma 5: For P AE ∈ P(A × E), we have
Proof: We choose m := nH(P AE |P E )+ √ n V (P AE P E )B 1 + V (P AE P E )B 2 with B 1 := Φ −1 (ε). We apply Proposition 10 to the case with X = − log P AE P E and the distribution P AE . Then, we obtain
Next, we apply Lemma 3 to the case with the measure P E on A × E, X = log
, s 0 = 1, and R 0 = −H(P AE P E ). Then, we obtain
Hence, we have
where (a) follows from Lemma 4, and (b) follows from the combination (107) and (108). The equation
) holds if and only if the following relation holds
which implies
Therefore, the equation δ min (m|P
) holds if and only if V (P AE P E )B 2 = F ε 1 (P AE P E ). This statement is equivalent to the desired statement.
For the proofs of (25) and (26), we prepare the following two lemmas.
Lemma 6:
The maximum max x x − ae x/2 equals 2(log 2 − log a − 1) and it is achieved by x = 2 log 2 a . The maximum max x x − ae x equals − log a − 1 and it is achieved by x = − log a. Lemma 7: For P AE ∈ P(A × E), we have
Proof: We have
Also, we have Combining (113) and (114), we have
Hence, we obtain (112). The relation (25) follows from the following Lemma 8. Lemma 8: For P AE ∈ P(A × E), we have
Proof: In this proof, we employ the expression of ℓ ε min (P AE |P E ) given in Lemma 7. We choose m := nH(P AE |P E ) + √ n V (P AE P E )B 1 + V (P AE P E )B 2 and m ′ := m + log 2 − log(πn) + B 3 with B 1 = Φ −1 (ε). Using (109), we have
The relation
holds if and only if
Applying Lemma 6, we have
Due to the combination of (117), (119), (120), and Lemma 7, when B 2 is chosen in (119) and B 3 is chosen to achieve the maximum in (120), the value m ′ equals to the RHS of (116) because the sum of the RHS of (120) and log 2 − log π equals F ε 2 (P AE P E ). Hence, we obtain (116). To prove the relation (26), we prepare the following lemma. Lemma 9: For P AE ∈ P(A × E), we have
where f is a function taking values in [0, 1] and
Proof: While we have
, we can restrict Q to a measure of the form P AE f . In this case, e −H 2 (Q|P E ) = a,e P AE (a, e) 2 f (a, e) 2 P E (e). Hence, we obtain (121). We restrict the function f to be a test function with support − log
> m . Then, we obtain the inequality (122).
The relation (26) follows from the following Lemma 10.
Lemma 10: For P AE ∈ P(A × E), we have
log(2πn) + B 3 with B 1 = Φ −1 (ε). We apply Lemma 3 to the case with the measure
Combining (107) and (126), we have
(127) The relation
Lemma 6 implies that
Due to the combination of (127) and (130) yields (125), when B 2 is chosen in (129) and B 3 is chosen to achieve the maximum in (130), the value m ′ equals to the RHS of (125) because the sum of the RHS of (130) and 2 log 2−
≤ ε} equals the RHS of (125). Using Lemma 9, we obtain (125).
X. PROOF OF THEOREMS 2 AND 3

A. Proof of Theorem 2
In this section, we abbreviate d (P Q) to d. We choose m := nD(P Q)+ √ n V (P Q)B 1 + V (P Q)B 2 with B 1 = Φ −1 (ε). We apply Proposition 10 to the case with X = log P Q and the distribution P . Then, we obtain
The relation P n log
) holds if and only if
Next, we apply Lemma 3 to the case with the measure Q on A, X = log
The combination of (133) and (132) yields (46) .
B. Proof of Theorem 3 Define
We find that
Hence, we have V (P Q)( κ(P Q)(B 
When B 2 is chosen in (139) and B 3 is chosen to achieve the maximum in (140), the value m ′ equals to the RHS of (49) because the RHS of (140) equals F ε 5 (P Q). Hence, max{m ′ |∃m such that ∆ DT (m ′ , m|P n Q n ) ≤ ε} equals the RHS of (49). Using (136), we obtain (49).
XI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have made semi-finite length analysis for upper and lower bounds for various problems, secure random number generation, simple binary hypothesis testing, fixed-length source coding with and without side information, channel coding with conditional additive channel, and wire-tap channel coding with conditional additive and degraded channel. Obtained results are summarized in Table I . Unfortunately, we could not discuss the random coding union (RCU) bound because it requires more complicated evaluation. Since the RCU bound is better than the DT bound, higher order expansion of the RCU bound is an interesting future problem. Thus, we haveP AE ∈ B ε (P AE ). Furthermore, by the construction ofP AE , we haveP AE (a, e) ≤P SZ (f (x), z) for every (a, e). Thus, we have
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APPENDIX B PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3 Since the first inequality in (22) follows from (5), we show the second inequality in (22) . Then, we defineH ε min (P AE |R E ) := max
H min (Q AE |R E ),
The following is a key lemma to derive every lower bound of ℓ(P AE , ε). Lemma 11 (Leftover Hash: [36] , [48] , [47] ): Let F be the uniform random variable on a set of universal 2 hash family F . Then, for P AE ∈P(A × E) and R E ∈ P(E), we have
Furthermore, since
holds forP AE ∈B ε (P AE ) by the triangular inequality, we have the following. Corollary 1 ([34, Corollary 2] ): For P AE ∈ P(A × E) and R E ∈ P(E), we have
Corollary 1 implies the second inequality in (22) . 1 Technically, RE must be such that supp(PE) ⊂ supp(RE).
APPENDIX C PROOF OF SECOND INEQUALITY IN PROPOSITION 4
Given the memory set M with the cardinality M, we randomly choose the encoder F such that
Given a encoder f : X → M, we define decoder g f as follows. Given m ∈ M and y ∈ Y, we decide g f (m, y) to be an element x ∈ X to satisfy that y ∈ Q x where Q x := {y|P XY (x, y) ≥ 1 M P Y (y)}. If no element x ∈ X satisfies this condition, we decide g f (m, y) to be an arbitrary element of X . In this code, the decoding error probability is upper bounded by
The average of the second term with respect to the choice of f is evaluated as follows.
Hence, the average of (142) is upper bounded by
This evaluation with yields the second inequality of (52). in their proof in the quantum setting. Since it considers the quantum setting, the coefficients in their upper bound are (1 + c) and
due to the use of Hayashi-Nagaoka inequality to handles the noncommutativity. In the commutative setting, we can replace them by 1. Hence, the upper bound (145) equals the upper bound (144).
